The current conflict in Western Sudan is an economic one.

The case of Sudan is a perfect example of the internal fragility of the Arab state, the interconnectedness and overlapping between internal and international politics, and the vulnerability to regional and international powers.² 

Over the past 19 months, international media have often represented the conflict in Darfur as a case of murderous, government-backed Arab militias called Janjaweed against a virtually helpless indigenous African population.³ This oversimplification has failed to put the conflict in its proper perspective. In fact, Darfur’s Arabs are black, indigenous, African and Muslim—just like Darfur’s non-Arabs, who come from Fur, Masalit, Zaghawa, and a dozen smaller tribes.⁴ 

The conflict began in 2003, when two new rebel groups—The Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)—took up arms against government military installations. The two groups represent various ethnicities, all of which speak Nilotic languages and come from sedentary farming communities.⁵ The sedentary Nilotics of Darfur were intermittently subjected to attacks by marauding horsemen—the Janjaweed, nomads of various local tribes who speak the Darfuri Arabic dialect.

Conflicts in Darfur between settled farmers and nomads migrating in search for water have been commonplace for centuries, but traditionally solutions were reached by negotiations. In fact, nomads and farmers in Darfur have a long history of interdependence and intermarriage.⁶ However, during the 1980s and 1990s, conflict caused by resource competition increased due to the intensification of drought and desertification.

In light of the grim realities on the ground, The SLA and the JEM demanded that the Sudanese government stop arming the nomadic groups in Darfur and address long-standing grievances over underdevelopment in the region.⁷

Setting aside its most recent military intervention that forced the Liberian President, Charles Taylor, into exile in Nigeria, the US has been satisfied with making occasional statements on African crises.¹⁰The US and the rest of the international community remained silent as the Christian “Lord’s Resistance Army” in Uganda killed tens of thousands of people, often mutilating their bodies, displaced more than 1.6 million people, kidnapped thousands of children, and forced many to become soldiers or sex slaves.¹¹ 

The US-controlled global financial institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank, have contributed to obstructing the development of Sudan, Chad, and other countries in the region. The Guardian’s analyst George Monbiot contends that the “cannibalistic IMF [is] responsible for more deaths every year in Africa than the Janjaweed.”¹²

In July,  Washington, backed by the European Union, began a campaign against the Sudanese government. On July 1, Colin Powell visited  Khartoum and threatened that if the Sudanese government did not take concrete steps towards the disarming of the Janjaweed, the “international community” would be considering other actions.¹³ 

The Sudanese government then issued a joint communiqué with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, promising to “immediately start disarming the Janjaweed and other armed outlaw groups,” “allow the deployment of human rights monitors,” and “ensure that all individuals and groups accused of human rights violations are brought to justice without delay.” ¹⁴

Despite Khartoum’s efforts, in mid-July Powel circulated a draft UN Security Council resolution that threatened Khartoum with unspecified sanctions unless it implemented the July 3 UN-Sudan communiqué. Both Britain and Australia added to Washington’s pressure on Khartoum by declaring their willingness to send troops to the troubled region if called upon. On July 22, the US Congress unanimously called on President Bush to consider “multilateral or even unilateral intervention to prevent ‘genocide’ should the United Nations Security Council fail to act.” ¹⁵ Subsequently, a final resolution was passed by the UN Security Council warning that unless Khartoum made progress in implementing the July 3 communiqué within 30 days of the resolution’s adoption, the UN Security Council would “consider further actions.”  

The active involvement of Western powers, especially the United States, in the Darfur crisis has led some analysts to suggest that Western moves are part of a larger geopolitical pincer movement aimed at the gradual disintegration of Sudan, spearheaded by John Garang and his Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) with the active encouragement of the West. It is no coincidence that renewed fighting in Darfur was brought to the limelight at the very moment when a peace agreement was about to be signed between the Sudanese government and Southern Sudan’s SPLA/M. Allegedly, the Darfuri rebels feared that they would be left out of any peace agreement between the government of Sudan and the SPLA/M, and thus worked to strike a deal for themselves. According to reports by the Brussels-based International Crisis Group (ICG), the SPLA/M trained 1,500 Darfuri rebels in southwestern Sudan in March 2002. The first SLA political declaration of  March 13, 2003 was edited by exiled Darfur activists and SPLA/M leaders. Moreover, the chairman of the SLA, Abdel Wahid, met officially with Garang in Asmara, Eritrea in April 2004.¹⁶

For years, the US administration has worked to dictate peace in  Sudan on terms favorable to the southern separatists, always threatening the Sudanese government with renewed military offensives in the south, fully supplied and backed up by the United States and Britain.¹⁷ This has left the Sudanese government facing a war on two-fronts: An unfinished war in the south and an ongoing one in the West.  

The currently influential Christian Right has for long seen the regime in Sudan as too “fundamentalist” and is bothered by the fact that the peace deal between the north and south has allowed the Bashir regime to remain in power. Hence, they see the Darfur conflict as a second chance to get rid of the regime in Khartoum.¹⁸  

Egypt, also, has extensive interests in  Sudan. A US or Western involvement in its southern neighbor would definitely have repercussions on Egyptian policy. In recent months, Anglo-American pressure has led Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania to question the old Nile treaties with  Egypt.¹⁹ Prior to the events in Darfur, the Egyptian response to the US-sponsored Machakos agreement was very tepid, and many in Cairo raised doubts that the protocols laid the foundation for an independent southern Sudan—an outcome which would stand in stark contrast to Egypt’s national interests in a unified Sudan under Khartoum’s control. Egyptian officials felt that the Machakos agreement bypassed the Egyptian-Libyan Initiative (August 1999) and failed to recognize the national interests of Egypt:  

Any Egyptian government, regardless of its ideological inclinations, has to safeguard two things: national unity, and the unhindered supply of Nile water.... Any regional or international development that interferes, however remotely, with either of these two imperatives inevitably raises alarm in Cairo.²⁰ 

The Nile remains the single most important facet of Egyptian geopolitics; without the river, Egypt would cease to exist. As early as the 1970s, Egyptian Air Force bombers and reconnaissance aircraft routinely patrolled Sudanese skies, and Egypt intervened militarily several times in the 1980s against Libyan attempts to destabilize  Sudan.²¹

There is also the possibility of extensive Israeli activities in the Horn of Africa, another source of alarm for Egypt. Evidence suggests that there is intelligence and military cooperation between Israel and both Kenya and Eritrea to curb the so-called forces of “Islamic fundamentalism” emanating from the Sudanese government.²²

Oil is a vital resource for both warring parties as well as regional and international actors. “Oil is a symbol of the Sudanese problem: Sudan’s recent history of decolonization, failed nation-building and its continuing political affairs are reflected in the story of oil. Economic factors, such as oil exploration and extraction, show not only that considerations of the global economy dominate political decision-making but also clearly indicate the underlying sources of conflict in Sudan.”²³

The targeting of oil facilities and pipelines in Iraq and Saudi Arabia by anti-US militants has increased the urgency for alternative sources of oil, and in light of the change in US foreign policy after September 11, states such as Libya and Sudan are becoming increasingly important for the US in its bid to control the world’s oil reserves. “Libyan oil production already ranks second to African oil giant Nigeria, and Sudan, if fully explored by oil geologists, could eventually rival oil behemoth Saudi Arabia.” ²⁴ Sudan’s oil resources are estimated to be worth at least US $53 billion at current prices. ²⁵ Some estimates put Sudan’s known reserves at 1.2 billion barrels, with another 800 million of recoverable reserves.²⁶

More importantly, China and the US are engaged in fierce competition over oil interests in Sudan. China is currently Sudan’s largest trading partner, and the National Petroleum Corporation (NPC)—which is wholly owned by China—already has a 40% share in oil extraction operations in Sudan.²⁷ US Assistant Secretary of State Walter Katsteiner suggested, “We don’t foresee anything stopping the Chinese from increasing their equity participation in oil, and I think it probably would be problematic if they were the dominant player.”²⁸

Historically, foreign meddling in southern  Sudan’s civil war (particularly the supply of arms and money to Christian and animist rebels) prolonged the conflict and delayed a peace settlement for decades.²⁹ Thus, any Western military intervention in the Darfur crisis would further inflame anti-Western sentiments and provide more credibility to those who believe that the West is pursuing a modern crusade against the world of Islam. Interestingly, recent attempts by the US in both Afghanistan and Iraq to rekindle ethnic, sectarian, and tribal animosities bear a striking resemblance to  America’s divisive policies in Sudan and elsewhere in the Middle East. An imperial policy of “divide and rule” is in full force.